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Abstract The free-energy principle states that all systems that resist a tendency to physical 
disintegration must minimize their free energy. Originally proposed to account for perception, 
learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, 
morphology, and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a 
natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the 
relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status and scope are unclear. Also 
unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science 
phenomena, such as organicism and mechanicism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies 
limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. 
Keywords: adaptation; free energy; life; mechanism; organicism 
 
1 Introduction 
According to the free-energy principle (FEP), all systems that resist a tendency to physical 
disintegration must minimize their free energy. Originally proposed to explain how sensory cortex 
infers the causes of its inputs and learns causal regularities, FEP has been used to elucidate the 
function of action, perception, and attention, and to account for organisms’ evolution and 
development (Friston 2003, 2009, 2010a, 2013; Friston et al. 2006; Friston & Stephan 2007). 
Advocates have claimed FEP offers a “framework within which to explain the constitutive coupling 
of the brain to the body and the environment,” which provides “a normative, teleological essence to 
the synthesis of biology and information,” and which may illuminate the continuity between life 
and mind (Allen & Friston 2018: 2476). 
 Advocates present FEP as a “mandatory principle” or “imperative” for biological systems, 
and as a principle enjoying a “fundamental status” in neuroscience (Friston et al. 2006: 71; Friston 
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& Stephan 2007). The principle purportedly “applies to any biological system [...] from single-cell 
organisms to social networks” (Friston 2009: 293). These bold ascriptions have attracted attention 
in philosophy and the life sciences. However, FEP’s epistemic status remains opaque, along with its 
exact role in biological and neuroscientific theorizing. 
 Regarding its role in theorizing, FEP seemingly conflicts with tenets of two of the most 
prominent contemporary theoretical approaches in the life sciences: organicism (Gilbert & Sarkar 
2000; Soto et al. 2016) and mechanism (Brandon 1984; Bechtel & Richardson 1993/2010). 
Regarding its epistemic status, one worry is that FEP lacks explanatory power because it “is 
divorced from the biophysical reality of the nervous system” (Fiorillo 2010: 605). The principle’s 
unifying power has been called into question, too. Some have suggested that FEP provides an 
implausible model of the functional roles of perception and action (Gershman & Daw 2012; 
Colombo 2017; Klein 2018); others have argued that FEP doesn’t deliver a grand unifying theory, 
and a plurality of modeling approaches is preferable for explaining complex neurophysiological and 
cognitive phenomena (Marblestone et al. 2016; Colombo & Wright 2017). Also controversial is 
how FEP illuminates the continuity between life and mind, synthesizing biology and information—
especially if FEP is committed to some form of cognitivism (Hohwy 2016; Kirchhoff & Froese 
2017). Most basically, the inferential steps in the reasoning leading to FEP need still be laid out 
clearly and accessibly to allow for adequate evaluation. 
 According to organicists (aka ‘holists’), phenomena studied in the life sciences should be 
explained by appealing to whole organisms. Organicists often appeal to the principles of biological 
autonomy and adaptivity (Varela, Maturana, & Uribe 1974; Di Paolo & Thompson 2014; Moreno 
& Mossio 2015), organization as closure of constraints (Maturana 1975; Mossio et al. 2016), and 
variation as extended criticality (Montévil et al. 2016). While FEP borrows the formalism of 
random dynamical systems to explain the behavior and nature of organisms, organicists maintain 
that the formalisms borrowed from current theories in physics are not apt for the representation of 
life science phenomena (Longo et al. 2012). 
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 According to mechanists, phenomena studied in the life sciences should be explained by 
appealing to the component parts and operations of mechanisms, where a mechanism is a 
spatiotemporally-organized composite system producing a phenomenon (Bechtel & Richardson 
1993/2010; Darden 2006). While FEP is used to logically derive claims about structural and 
functional properties of the brain “a priori, on the basis of purely theoretical considerations” 
(Friston 2003: 1325), mechanistic philosophers argue that laws and logical deduction do not 
adequately capture explanation in the life sciences (Glennan 2017). 
 In this paper, we clarify the epistemic status of FEP by answering two sets of questions. 
First: what are the inferential steps leading to FEP? And how do they relate to one another? Second: 
what’s the relationship between FEP and central tenets of the organicist and mechanistic 
philosophies when it comes to adequate scientific representation of the phenomena of life? 
 To answer these questions, we provide a transparent reconstruction of the reasoning leading 
to FEP (§2) and then deploy a contrastive strategy to bring out salient assumptions of FEP. We 
argue that FEP is inconsistent with a tenet of organicism, specifically that the formalism and 
concepts of current physical theories are not apt for the scientific representation of organisms and 
their behaviors (§3). We also show that FEP is inconsistent with mechanistic approaches in the life 
sciences, which eschew laws and theories and take the explanatory power of scientific 
representations to be dependent on the degree of relevant biophysical detail they include. After we 
clarify the status of FEP as a first principle (§4), we conclude by suggesting that understanding 
phenomena in the life sciences should allow for incompatible approaches (§5). In particular, the 
axiomatic, idealizing, first-principles methods favored by free-energy theorists should be pursued in 
the life sciences alongside the synthetic methods favored by organicists, and the analytic methods 
favored by mechanists. 
  
2 The transcendental argument 
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Free-energy theorists formulate FEP in various ways. Depending on the exact formulation, the 
scope of application of FEP varies. One formulation has FEP focused on brains, aiming to clarify 
the functional significance of their activity and structural connectivity (Friston 2003, 2009; Friston 
et al. 2006). Another has FEP ranging over any biological entity, process, or complex system— 
including brainless organisms like single cells and plants, evolutionary processes by natural 
selection, and ecosystems—and aiming to explain how biological systems can maintain their 
physical integrity in a changing environment (Friston 2013; Hobson & Friston 2016). In yet another 
formulation, FEP applies to any complex adaptive system, including physical information systems 
and non-biological systems like social networks and artefacts (Friston 2009: 293). 
 Under any formulation, the reasoning leading to FEP has the form of a transcendental 
argument for the conclusion that FEP is a condition on the very possibility of systems maintaining 
their physical integrity and displaying adaptive behavior. Beginning with the observation that some 
systems behave adaptively, resisting a tendency to disorder, the transcendental deduction of FEP 
involves five main steps organized in two batches: 
 
(1)  If a system Σ acts selectively on the environment to avoid phase transitions and is in a 
non-equilibrium steady-state, then Σ behaves adaptively.1 
(2)  Σ behaves adaptively only if Σ preserves its physical integrity by maintaining its 
“characteristic” variables within homeostatic bounds despite environmental fluctuations.2 
                                                 
1 As explained in §2.1, equilibrium refers to thermodynamic equilibrium. A system is in a steady state if the variables 
defining the behavior of the system are unchanging with time. An equilibrium state is a special case of a steady state. (A 
system in equilibrium is one in a steady state; the converse isn’t necessarily true.) 
2 Values of these characteristic variables would be observable properties of “the extended phenotype of the organism—
its morphology, physiology, behavioural patterns, cultural patterns, and designer environments,” and would be phase 
functions of an attracting set of the organism’s states (Ramstead et al. 2017: 3). The idea is that any living system 
possesses an ‘attracting set’, i.e., a set of states towards which it will tend to evolve, for a wide variety of values of its 
initial states, and “this set of attracting states can be interpreted as the extended phenotype of the organism” (ibid). Free-
energy theorists’ transcendental deduction assumes that an attracting set in a system open to its external milieu is 
formally equivalent to a steady-state solution that is far from equilibrium. 
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(3)  Σ acts selectively on the environment to avoid phase transitions and is in a non-
equilibrium steady-state just in case Σ preserves its physical integrity by maintaining its 
“characteristic” variables within homeostatic bounds despite environmental fluctuations. 
(4)  Σ preserves its physical integrity by maintaining its “characteristic” variables within 
homeostatic bounds despite environmental fluctuations just in case Σ minimizes the 
informational entropy (average surprise) of its possible sensory states. 
(5)   If Σ minimizes the informational entropy of its possible sensory states, Σ minimizes the 
free energy of its possible sensory states.3 
∴ (6)  for any system Σ to maintain its physical integrity and behave adaptively despite 
environmental fluctuations, Σ must minimize its free energy. 
 
The first three claims comprise the first batch, where (1) states a sufficient condition on adaptive 
behavior, (2) states a necessary condition, and (3) functions as a bridge principle that connects 
physical and biological predicates. The bridge is derivable from the conjunction of its left-to-right 
conditional, which follows directly from (1) and (2), and the stipulation of its suppressed right-to-
left converse. The next two claims comprise the second batch, where (4) stipulatively connects 
homeostasis to information-theoretic quantities, and (5) states that free-energy minimization is a 
necessary condition on minimizing informational entropy.4 Claim (6) expresses FEP, and follows 
from the two batches of claims. 
                                                 
3 According to some formulations, any system that conserves its boundaries “can be described as” modeling its external 
milieu or “can be cast as” minimizing free energy (Hobson & Friston 2016: 246; Ramstead et al. 2017: 2). In other 
formulations, the system itself is said to be the modeler (Friston 2011). We address this confusion in §3. 
4 Premise 5 should be treated with care. First, in machine learning, free energy is a variational bound on informational 
entropy that often plays a central role in variational Bayesian inferences. Where X is an observed variable (e.g., a 
sensory sample) and Z a hidden random variable of interest (e.g., an environmental cause of a sensory sample), the idea 
behind variational Bayesian inference is to find some approximation distribution density q(Z) that is tractable and that is 
as close as possible to the true posterior distribution p(Z|X). As the approximation distribution can have its own 
parameters q(Z|), the problem of inferring the value of Z given the value of X can be understood as an optimization 
problem, in which one aims to find the parameter values that minimize some objective function and make q as close as 
possible to the posterior of interest. To measure the closeness of the two distributions q(Z) and p(Z|X), a common metric 
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Second, free-energy theorists argue that organisms cannot minimize the 
informational entropy of their sensory states (i.e., ‘surprisal’) directly, because this involves the intractable problem of 
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 The modal force of FEP, as well as its claim to being an a priori first principle, depend on 
free-energy theorists’ understanding of the predicate being an adaptive system, on assumptions 
about the semantic equivalence between concepts from different disciplines, and on their 
interpretation of probability. We’ll consider their understanding of adaptive living systems in §2.2, 
and put into sharper focus the other two assumptions underlying their reasoning in §3. 
 
2.1 Thermodynamics 
The argument for FEP begins with the observation that some systems maintain their physical 
integrity and display adaptive behavior amid a changing environment. Such systems are 
thermodynamically open, persisting far from their thermodynamic equilibrium state (Friston et al. 
2006: 71–72; Friston & Stephan 2007: 421–422). Systems that are thermodynamically open 
exchange matter and energy with their surroundings. For example, both snowflakes and bacteria 
exchange chemicals and energy with their surroundings. Snowflakes acquire and lose matter and 
heat under the causal pressures of their environment, and bacteria allow matter and energy to cross 
their cytoplasmic membranes. Closed systems have boundaries that matter from their surroundings 
cannot cross. Earth, for example, exchanges energy with its surroundings, but hardly any matter. 
Isolated systems exchange neither energy nor matter with their surroundings. The universe and a 
closed thermos bottle are examples of isolated systems. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
computing marginal probabilities. Instead, they argue that organisms can tractably minimize the informational entropy 
of their sensory states indirectly, by minimizing a bound called ‘variational free energy’. As Buckley et al.’s (2017) 
helpful mathematical review makes clear, this claim requires qualification, since variational free energy is a tight bound 
on surprisal only when the organism’s current ‘best guess’ of the causes of its sensory input (represented by a 
‘recognition density function’ q(Z)) is identical with the posterior density of environmental states given the organism’s 
sensory input p(Z|X). Finding an optimal recognition density that is identical with the posterior is non-trivial, and 
requires further assumptions about its form, and about the form of the dynamics in the environment. “Furthermore, 
while this process furnishes the organism with an approximation of surprisal it does not minimise it. Instead the 
organism can minimise VFE [variational free energy] further by minimising surprisal indirectly by acting on the 
environment and changing sensory input” (Buckley et al. 2017: 59). Third and finally, as one reviewer suggested, free-
energy theorists may be inclined for technical reasons to endorse, not premise 5, but its converse. If they are right and 
minimizing free energy is always sufficient for minimizing informational entropy, then the transcendental deduction 
will be invalid. We’ll return on some of these points in §2.4. 
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 Rather than properties of Σ—like being thermodynamically open, or being in equilibrium—
it may be useful to speak of (sets of) states. The term state here refers to a property instance at a 
time. Velocities, for example, are states: different objects can have different velocities over time but 
only a single velocity at any given time. A system’s states are specified by the values of sets of 
measurable macroscopic variables, including geometric, thermal, mechanical, and chemical 
properties at a given time scale, and can typically be associated with mathematical representations, 
e.g., vectors in a vector- or state-space. Such variables are related to one another in law-like ways, 
and so provide a way to deduce changes in the system’s behavior over time. 
 When systems are left to themselves and external conditions are unchanging, their states 
change until there are no net flows of matter or energy either within the system or between it and its 
surroundings. This state is thermodynamic equilibrium. Although most systems found in nature 
aren’t in equilibrium, there are important differences across systems. In comparison to snowflakes 
left to themselves, bacteria are far from their equilibrium state: while their chemical and metabolic 
properties change, the bacteria can acquire energy and nutrients, and maintain a non-equilibrium 
steady state to avoid thermodynamic equilibrium. 
 When systems change states, they undergo a process. The succession of a system’s states 
defines the process’s path or trajectory. Some processes involve abrupt discontinuous transitions 
between solid, liquid, or gaseous states of matter. These transitions are called phase transitions. 
When systems undergo phase transitions, some of their physical properties change—often resulting 
from changes in temperature, pressure, or other surrounding conditions. For example, snowflakes 
will phase transition into water droplets when external temperature reaches its melting point. Many 
biological systems also undergo phase transitions, where their morphological and metabolic profiles 
change dramatically. These transitions depend on phenotypic plasticity, which is the ability of 
biological systems with one genotype to change their phenotype in response to changing 
environmental conditions. Examples include temperature-dependent sex determination in some fish 
and reptiles, eye-spot formations in some butterflies, and insect metamorphosis. 
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 Because of the second law of thermodynamics, the path of the process undergone by a 
system isolated from all external influences eventually goes into a state of thermodynamic 
equilibrium. There are several formulations of the law (Uffink 2001). One formulation refers to 
thermodynamic entropy, which is a state variable measuring the amount of “disorder” (or 
randomness) in a system, and implies that entropies of isolated systems not in equilibrium typically 
increase over time, approaching maximum value at equilibrium. It is a function of a system’s state, 
and captured by the formula: S = k log(W). This formula describes the entropy S of a system in 
terms of the logarithm of the number of possible microstates W = {w1, w2, ..., wn} that are consistent 
with the macroscopic states of the system, where k is the Boltzmann constant. 
 Comparing snowflakes with water vapor offers one intuitive way of visualizing the notion of 
“disorder” associated with thermodynamic entropy. Water vapor in a container can have many 
possible arrangements of individual molecules consistent with the macroscopic properties of the gas 
like its volume and pressure. Because snowflakes’ molecules are constrained by crystalline bonds, 
the number of possible configurations of individual molecules consistent with the macroscopic 
properties of snowflakes is smaller. Snowflakes have less entropy than water vapor: they are less 
“disordered” (random). 
 
2.2 From thermodynamics to homeostasis 
Free-energy theorists claim that biological systems apparently “resist” or “violate” the second law 
of thermodynamics because they maintain their physical integrity in the face of random fluctuations 
in the environment (Friston & Stephan 2007: 421–422; Ramstead et al. 2017: 2 ff.). Biological 
systems are open systems that maintain “order” (or thermodynamic entropy) by exchanging energy 
and matter with their surroundings. Upon considering all such exchanges, the total entropy of the 
system and its environment increases over time in ways that can be described by thermodynamical 
laws and principles. It’s this capacity for “negative entropy”—acting selectively upon their 
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environments and metabolizing food, which distinguishes living from non-living systems (Collier 
1986; Schrödinger 1992; Collier & Hooker 1999; Morowitz & Smith 2007; Bailly & Longo 2009). 
 A system’s capacity to act selectively upon its environment enables the system to maintain 
its physical integrity amid changing environmental conditions. Friston & Stephan (2007) illustrate 
this point with a fictitious example. They compare regular snowflakes with winged snowflakes that 
can act on their environment. Regular snowflakes are passively pushed around by environmental 
forces until their temperatures reach a certain threshold, where they undergo phase-transitions, 
losing their integrity and turning into water droplets. Because winged snowflakes can fly and keep 
certain altitudes, they can maintain their temperature within bounds and away from their melting 
point. Maintaining their temperature within certain bounds is a necessary condition for the winged 
snowflakes to keep a non-equilibrium steady state so that they may avoid a phase transition and 
disintegration. So, winged snowflakes can maintain a “relatively constant milieu” despite 
environmental changes—that is, maintain homeostasis—via behaviors that adjust to new or 
changing conditions while maintaining their macroscopic properties within bounds. Because their 
behaviors enable winged snowflakes to maintain homeostasis, those behaviors, unlike regular 
snowflakes, are said to be adaptive. 
 We have two conditions on a system’s adaptive behavior. One is in terms of 
thermodynamics: if systems act selectively upon their environments to preclude phase transitions 
and stay away from thermodynamic equilibrium, then they behave adaptively. And another is in 
terms of homeostasis: if systems behave adaptively, then they change their relationships with their 
environments to maintain vital physiological variables within certain bounds. 
 Free-energy theorists link adaptivity directly to viability, understood in terms of 
homeostasis, similarly to Ashby’s (1960: 58) account of adaptation as ultrastability did. For free-
energy theorists, “characteristics for phase-dependent measurement function”—or as Ashby called 
them, essential variables—must be kept within viable limits to prevent the system from dying 
rapidly or disintegrating from phase transitions. Like Ashby (1960), free-energy theorists relate 
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thermodynamic and biological formulations of adaptive processes (see e.g., Friston & Stephan 
2007). Specifically, free-energy theorists assume that any living system possesses a random 
dynamical attractor—a set of states towards which a dynamical system tends to evolve for a wide 
variety of initial conditions of the system’s state. This attractive set is interpreted as the system’s 
extended phenotype, which includes characteristics defining a kind of biological system. Under 
appropriate conditions, any system possessing a random dynamical attractor can be shown to be 
formally equivalent to any system at a steady state far from equilibrium, where the system’s 
“characteristic” variables are within homeostatic bounds (Friston 2012; Ramstead et al. 2017).5 In 
other words, the paths of the processes of adaptive (living) systems fall within a specific, relatively 
narrow region of all possible states in their phase space. For Friston, no less than Ashby, survival is 
equivalent to the system’s being in that narrow region. 
 With these physical and biological formulations articulated, the argument’s next step is to 
deploy the mathematics of random dynamical systems theory and information theory to answer the 
following question. What characteristics must biological systems possess to maintain their path 
within a specific (homeostatic) region that precludes phase transitions? 
 
2.3 From homeostasis to surprise 
Physical systems can be represented as sets of variables. Different values of these variables pick out 
different states of the systems. The set of all possible states of a system can be represented as a state 
space, which allows one to describe the system and its changes in time. A phase space is a 
continuous state space described with a smooth manifold. A space’s dimensionality depends on 
how many variables are needed to completely describe the target system and its dynamics. Each 
state of the system is represented with a point in the state space. Given the state of the system at any 
                                                 
5 Equating adaptation and viability renders Ashby’s concept of essential variables unclear. If essential, in what sense 
can its values be transgressed without causing death? Or, if such transgression is possible, then in what sense are they 
essential? The construct ALLOSTASIS may offer, here, a way to understand how organisms can operate outside of normal 
set-points and approximate equilibria values, without leading to the total cessation of all physiological function. 
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moment, one can use an evolution rule, which can be either deterministic or stochastic, to describe 
the next states of the system in state space. 
 Friston (2012, 2013) represents biological systems as random dynamical systems, with state 
spaces partitioned into external and internal states. External states correspond to environmental 
causes that generate sensory samples (also known as sensory input, sensory outcomes, sensory data, 
or evidence), which affect the system’s internal state. A subset of states (known as Markov 
blanket—more on this momentarily) can ground a separation between the internal states of the 
system and the external states of the environment. A further subset of these separating (blanket) 
states is distinguished as its so-called active states, where different values of an active state 
determine different positions of the system in the environment. 
 The justification for partitioning these states appeals to the construct MARKOV BLANKET 
(Friston 2013). Pearl (1988) introduced this concept in relation to Markov networks for representing 
probabilistic knowledge. Roughly, given a set of random variables N, the Markov blanket for a 
variable x ∈ N is the subset M containing all random variables that “shield” x from all the other 
variables in N. Fixing the values of the variables in M leaves x conditionally independent of all 
other random variables; hence, the Markov blanket of a random variable is the only knowledge one 
may need to predict the behavior of that variable (Pearl 1988: 97 ff.). 
 In machine learning, Markov blankets help address problems with constructing sets of 
causal models from sample data that are as small as possible, and help search these sets to find a 
true causal model (Spirtes et al. 2000). Friston (2013), however, supposes further that Markov 
blankets are objective features of the real world separating the states internal to biological systems 
from those external to them (more on this reification in §3). His mathematical representation of 
system’s exchanges with their environments involves four basic types of quantities (for a helpful 
review of the mathematical details, see Buckley et al. 2017): 
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1. a time-varying parameter Ψ = {ψ1, …, ψn} standing for environmental states that cause 
sensory samples and vary nonlinearly over time; 
2. a time-varying parameter A = {a1, …, an} that changes the way the system samples the 
environment; 
3. a variable D = {y1, …, yn}, defined as a function of the system’s active state an and 
environmental state ψn, that denotes the set of possible sensory samples that influence the 
physical state of the system; 
4. a statistical model M—which, if Gaussian, can be defined with time-varying parameters θ 
= {μ, σ2}—of how environmental causes Ψ generate sensory samples D. 
 
For biological systems, free-energy theorists state that M represents an organism’s phenotype, 
defined as “the repertoire of physiological and sensory states in which an organism can be” (Friston 
2010: 127), and add that an organism’s internal states should be formally representable using the 
time-varying parameter μ of a generative probability density function M (Friston & Stephan 2007: 
424). More specifically, internal states μ are represented by a posterior probability distribution over 
environmental causes of sensory samples; unlike μ, biological systems would not “encode” or 
“represent” M, which is (somewhat confusingly) said to be “entailed” by the organism’s phenotype 
(ibid; see also Friston 2012). In this context, entailment-talk plausibly means that M should be 
inferred from a suitable interpretation of the organism’s internal states, along with identifying the 
characteristics defining its kind. Given how free-energy theorists define phenotype, the generative 
model M provides the probability that a certain kind of system obtains any possible state in state 
space. In short, according to free-energy theorists, for any phenotype, there is a generative model M 
that renders the internal states of the phenotype as the sufficient statistics of posterior densities of 
external states under M. 
 In the winged snowflake example, external states include ambient temperature, wind 
direction, and other environmental factors that generate sensory samples (or inputs) influencing the 
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snowflake’s internal state. Internal states include its temperature and the strength of its 
microcrystals’ electrostatic bonds, but also active states like its local position in the environment at 
a time. The snowflake’s active state changes its position in the environment (i.e., this active state 
just is the state of velocity of the snowflake), so that it receives different sensory samples. Given the 
kind of system a winged snowflake happens to be, it’s improbable that states where its temperature 
is higher than 0° Celsius will obtain. 
 With respect to cells, external states include ambient temperature and pH. These states 
generate sensory samples (i.e., energy arrays impinging on organisms’ sensory surfaces) that 
influence the state of transmembrane receptors. The cell’s internal states include the concentration 
of intracellular metabolites, but also active states, like the motion of flagella at times, that change 
how the cell’s environment influences the cell’s receptors. Given the kind of system a cell happens 
to be, it’s improbable that states where its temperature is higher than 50° Celsius will obtain. 
 Given the four basic quantities (for external, sensory, active, and internal states of a 
biological system) and their relationships of probabilistic conditional (in)dependence, one can 
examine what characteristics a random dynamical system must possess so that its physical states 
“are confined to a bounded subset of states and remain there indefinitely” (Friston 2012: 2106). 
This subset of states in state space is a random dynamical attractor corresponding to a set of (non-
equilibrium) steady states, where levels of variables representing the sensory states of the system—
like temperature, pH, glucose, blood oxygenation, etc.—are within homeostatic bounds. To learn 
what characteristics biological systems must possess if they are to maintain their path within a 
specific (homeostatic) region that precludes phase transitions, free-energy theorists ask what 
dynamics such systems must exhibit for a random dynamical attractor to obtain. 
 If one then stipulates that “biological systems move around in their state space, but revisit a 
limited number of states” that correspond to homeostatic steady states far from equilibrium (Friston 
2013: 11), then, of all possible obtaining states, there’s a small number that they will achieve in 
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their lifetime with a high probability. All other possible states will be obtained with an exceedingly 
low probability. 
 To capture this idea formally, free-energy theorists use the information-theoretic concept 
SURPRISE. The average surprise of sampling some outcome corresponds to Shannon’s entropy, 
which is formally similar to the thermodynamic concept ENTROPY. Specifically, the surprise of 
sampling some sensory outcome can be represented with the negative log probability: −log p(Y = 
yt+1 | at, M). This measure quantifies the improbability that a system M samples a sensory outcome 
yn, given internal state µt and its action at. If the sampled sensory outcome is “incompatible” with M 
and at, then the sensory sample yt+1 is surprising. If there’s a high probability that biological systems 
are found at any point in their lifetime in homeostatic states, then environmentally-generated 
sensory samples will be unsurprising. Sensory samples generated by all other states in the 
environment will be highly surprising. 
 
2.4 From surprise to free energy 
If one stipulatively defines adaptively-behaving system as any system whose behavior minimizes 
the average surprise of its possible states, then actual systems behaving adaptively must sample 
unsurprising sensory outcomes. That is, the system’s objective is to maximize model evidence p(Y 
= yt+1 | M), or minimize surprise –log p(Y = yt+1 | at, M). This means, formally, that the system must 
select actions that optimize the function 
 
G(at) = log ∫ p(Y = yt+1, Ψ = ψt+1 | at) dΨ 
 
where p(Y = yt+1, Ψ = ψt+1 | A = at) is the joint density of sensory samples Y and their generating 
causes Ψ in the environment, conditioned on action and on a phenotype.6 This density factors into a 
                                                 
6 We have simplified by dropping the dependence on M. 
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likelihood p(Y = yt+1 | Ψ = ψt+1, A = at) and prior density p(Ψ = ψt+1), which jointly specify the 
generative model “entailed by” the system’s phenotype. Optimizing G(at) requires changes in 
actions or in the parameter μ that represents the internal state of systems with phenotype M. 
 However, optimizing G(at) involves an intractable marginalization over (hidden) 
environmental states Ψ. To overcome computational intractability, a variational (or ensemble) 
density q(Ψ, μ) can be introduced to define another quantity that is greater than surprise. This 
quantity—called free energy—provides a bound on the integral mentioned above, and is a function 
of sensory samples and internal states of the system. It is defined thus:7 
 
F(yt+1, μt+1 | at) = −log <p(Y = yt+1, Ψ = ψt+1 | A = at)>q + log <q(Ψ = ψt+1; μt+1)>q 
 
Under certain assumptions (cf., Dayan et al 1995; MacKay 1995), optimizing F(yt+1, μt+1 | at) is 
computationally tractable. In the context of FEP, this optimization involves changes only to internal 
parameters μ or to the action parameter a, which can be controlled by the system. 
 Because the free-energy function F is greater than G, by acting on the environment to 
minimize the free energy of their sensory samples, biological systems would indirectly avoid 
surprising sensory states. If they avoid surprising sensory states, biological systems may attain a 
homeostatic state; and by selecting actions that attain homeostatic states, biological systems will 
thereby behave adaptively. And by FEP, any system that minimizes the free energy of its sensory 
states with respect to action, or its internal parameters, would avoid phase transitions, which would 
make its physical disintegration unlikely. 
 
3 FEP and organicism 
                                                 
7 <.>q represents the expectation under the variational density q. 
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Having articulated the steps involved in the reasoning to FEP, let’s examine two dimensions along 
which FEP and organicism appear inconsistent: their understanding of how, adaptive organisms 
should be represented, and their interpretation of probability. 
 
3.1 How to represent organisms? 
Free-energy theorists formulate FEP using the traditional modeling tools of random dynamical 
systems in thermodynamics, and represent organisms’ adaptive dynamics as trajectories through 
attractive non-equilibrium states in phase space. For organicists, however, organisms’ adaptive 
dynamics cannot be adequately represented with this tool predefined over the “characteristic” 
variables individuating kinds of biological systems (Longo et al. 2012). 
 Organicists have different options for justifying this claim. They may deny the existence of 
an organism’s characteristics, or deny that characteristic variables (if they exist) can be reliably 
identified for any kind of biological system interacting with the environment. Another option is to 
emphasize that the mathematical tools used to represent and explain biological phenomena are 
merely that—abstract mathematical tools. For instance, Chater & Oaksford argue, albeit in a 
different context, that imputing these modeling tools to the phenomena themselves by requiring 
organisms to perform these calculations mischaracterizes how such principles are used to explain 
behavior: 
 
the theory of aerodynamics is a crucial component of explaining why birds can fly. But clearly 
birds know nothing about aerodynamics, and the computational intractability of aerodynamic 
calculations does not in any way prevent birds from flying. Similarly, [systems] do not need to 
calculate their optimal behavior functions to behave adaptively. They simply have to use 
successful algorithms; they do not have to be able to make the calculations that would show 
that these algorithms are successful. (2000: 110) 
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The suggestion is that these tools aren’t part of organisms’ biological or cognitive equipment. If so, 
this would bear directly on the posit of free energy, which free-energy theorists introduce because 
the optimization problem described in §2.4 is intractable. Yet, if there’s no imperative for 
organisms to compute solutions to the optimization problem, then the motivation to posit free 
energy dissipates. 
 Free-energy theorists assume that organisms are ergodic: their phase averages (i.e., average 
values of specified functions of their microscopic states) are identical to averages over time of 
quantities measurable from microscopic states. For ergodic systems, the dynamics of a system’s 
microstates—e.g., its biomolecular kinematics—are sufficiently random, and the coupling between 
the system and the external states in its environment is sufficiently slow, such that the microscopic 
dynamics of the system’s states can be replaced by a random sample from the ensemble density of 
the microscopic states. This ensemble density assigns a probability to each possible microscopic 
configuration, and can be used to derive predictions about macroscopic properties of the system as 
those expected in the ensemble. To assign probabilities to all microscopic configurations, the 
system is assumed to start in any microscopic state and traverse all possible microscopic states in 
phase space. Given ergodicity, for any region of phase space, the average time the system spends in 
that region is proportional to the region’s size. Ergodic systems will repeatedly revisit the 
neighborhoods of attracting states. So, if organisms are ergodic, they can be represented as random 
dynamical attractors in phase space. If such ergodic dynamical systems also possess a Markov 
blanket, then “[they’ll] appear to actively maintain their structural and dynamical integrity” (Friston 
2013: 10). Under certain conditions, such systems necessarily minimize their free energy. 
 Organicists will be quick to note that organisms, at all levels of organization above the level 
of molecules, cannot explore all possible paths. “Not only will we not make all possible proteins of 
length 200 or 2000, we will not make all possible organs, organisms, social systems, [... t]here is an 
indefinite hierarchy of non-ergodicity as the complexity of the objects we consider increases” 
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(Kauffman 2013: 167). For organicists, ergodicity is biologically irrelevant simply because 
organisms are non-ergodic (Longo et al. 2012). 
 If ergodicity were biologically irrelevant, and the average of any measure of the state of an 
organism doesn’t converge over a sufficient period of time, then it is misleading to represent an 
organism’s phenotype with an invariant, ergodic ensemble density that specifies the probability, for 
any possible microstate, that the organism is in a certain macrostate. And it would also be 
biologically irrelevant to note that, under ergodic assumptions, the long-term average of surprise is 
entropy. For organicists, FEP would thus be misleading and biologically irrelevant. 
 Free-energy theorists, however, would counter by asserting that the notion of an attracting 
set itself implies ergodicity. So, if all living systems possess an attracting set, then they must be 
ergodic too; and if those systems are ergodic, then they will possess characteristic measureable 
properties. For free-energy theorists, the dynamics of such systems will appear to place an upper 
bound on their informational entropy, and to maximize the evidence for a model M of external 
states “entailed” by their characteristic properties. This behavior—they would conclude—can be 
expressed as approximate Bayesian (active) inference about the causes of sensory input in terms of 
minimizing variational free energy.8 
 On the other hand, organicists have argued that organisms constitute historically grounded 
constraints on energy flows, where their phase space continually changes, and so organicists deny 
that living systems are aptly represented with a classical phase space. Since attracting sets are 
subsets of classically predefined phase spaces, organicists deny the assumption that all living 
systems’ characteristic behavior is aptly represented with an attracting set. Hence, for organicists, 
the implication from attracting sets to ergodicity is a red herring. 
                                                 
8 This inference-optimization bridge, which we also mentioned in fn. 4, is a powerful feature of variational methods that 
treat statistical inference problems as optimization problems. Minimizing variational free energy can thus be understood 
as approximate Bayesian inference, in the sense that minimizing free energy is formally equivalent to optimizing a 
variational bound on Bayesian model evidence. 
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Representing organisms and their dynamics while idealizing away from their non-ergodic 
status would prevent taking seriously the historical considerations of lineage that are essential to 
understanding what organisms are, and how they change over time. If historical considerations and 
lineage matter to understanding organisms and their dynamics, then biological systems should be 
represented as “specific” and their trajectories as “generic.” Instead, free-energy theorists get it 
backward: physical systems are “generic,” while their trajectories “specific” (Longo & Montévil 
2013: ch. 7). 
 If physical systems were “generic,” then different types of systems could be individuated by 
properties such as mass, charge, temperature, or momentum. Position and momentum, for example, 
define mechanical systems. The mathematical representation of physical systems of the same type 
will preserve formal symmetries between their defining characteristics.9 Each symmetry in 
mathematical representation implies that certain physical properties of the system, such as total 
kinetic energy, are conserved and remain unchanged as the system evolves over time (Gross 1996). 
However, for tokens of the same type of physical system, trajectories (or paths) would be “specific” 
since they are uniquely determined by the rules of the system’s evolution given its initial state. 
 In free-energy theorists’ representations, organisms are “generic.” Their representation in 
terms of actions, internal states, and generative models preserves symmetries in formulations of 
FEP. Trajectories in the phase space of organisms would be “specific” according to FEP, because 
solutions of FEP for a given kind of organism yield a unique trajectory in phase space given the 
initial state of the organism.10 Properties of organisms like lineage and heritability would just be an 
expression of a specific trajectory on a generic manifold, namely the attracting set. 
                                                 
9 For example, in Newtonian mechanics, given two bodies with the same mass starting from rest and moving in 
opposite directions with different velocities along the same axis, the total kinetic energy of the systems comprised of the 
two bodies remains the same if the velocities are interchanged. That is, the solution of the equation yielding the total 
kinetic energy will be the same if the velocities of the two bodies are interchanged. 
10 Friston (2012) relates this result to the principle of least action (PLA). In Hamilton’s formulation, action is defined as 
the integral along possible paths of a system’s process connecting two specified states. According to PLA, the actual 
path of the process between initial and final states in a specified time is a dynamical system’s trajectory in phase space, 
which is found “by imagining all possible trajectories that the system could conceivably take, computing the action for 
each of these trajectories, and selecting one that makes the action locally stationary” (Gray 2009). 
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 For Longo & colleagues (2012), organisms should instead be represented as “specific,” 
while their trajectories “generic.” Because of their historicity and materiality, organisms wouldn’t 
possess general characteristics that allow for mathematically invariant representations. They write, 
 
In biology, symmetries at the phenotypic level, are continually changed, beginning with the 
least mitosis, up to the “structural bifurcations” which yield speciations in evolution. Thus, 
there are no biological symmetries that are a priori preserved. […] There are no sufficiently 
stable mathematical regularities and transformations to allow an equational and lawlike 
description entailing the phylogenetic and ontogenetic trajectories. (2012: 1390) 
 
So, from an organicist’s perspective, organisms cannot—unlike non-living physical systems—be 
represented with a fixed phase space and rules of evolution predefined over some set of 
“characteristic,” mathematically invariant variables. 
 The disagreement between free-energy theorists and organicists cuts deeper still. Free-
energy theorists take an adaptationist and selectionist standpoint in biology, whereby “selection 
explains how biological systems arise and the only outstanding issue is what characteristics they 
must possess” (Friston & Stephan 2007: 423). Central to the organicist approach is instead a critical 
rejection of the adaptationist and selectionist perspective, which—they argue—is insufficient for 
explaining the autonomy of living beings, and their capacities to regulate their processes in relation 
to environmental conditions registered as viable or unviable, improving or deteriorating (Di Paolo 
& Thompson 2014; Moreno & Mossio 2015). 
 Furthermore, following Ashby (1940), FEP emphasizes homeostatic stability as the core 
feature of organisms. Accordingly, organisms should be represented as random dynamical 
attractors. Contemporary organicists like Longo & colleagues emphasize that organisms are 
fundamentally ever-changing processes, maintained in relatively stable conditions by further 
processes. Longo & Montévil (2013), for instance, advance the idea that organisms should be 
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represented as attaining extended critical phase transitions. Free-energy theorists generally construe 
undergoing a phase transition as equivalent to biological disintegration and death—although there 
are several examples of phase transitions in biology, such as metamorphosis, that are consistent 
with an attracting set, and, arguably, with the FEP too (Clark 2017). 
 Even so, Longo & Montévil (2013) argue that organisms’ adaptive behavior should be 
represented as a continuous critical transition from one phase to another, whereby organisms are 
continuously reconstructed with variations in their dynamic couplings with ecosystems. The basic 
idea is that ancestry continuously co-constitutes and reshapes organisms as well as by their 
interactions with ecosystems. This idea fits a growing wealth of evidence concerning phenotypic 
plasticity, whereby organisms with the same genotype can generate differing phenotypes through 
their interactions with the environment, which recreate novel conditions of existence passed on to 
their descendants (Montévil et al. 2016). 
 Free-energy theorists would again note that evolution, and natural selection in particular, is 
also a free-energy minimizing process (Hobson & Friston 2016; Ramstead et al. 2017). But, for 
organicists, selectionism, and the fixation on surprise-minimizing processes obscure the 
historically-grounded, environmentally co-constituted nature of biological adaptivity. 
 One last dimension of disagreement concerns the interpretation of the probabilities involved 
in scientific representations of changing organisms. In free-energy theorists’ accounts, probability 
plays a central role. Adaptive organisms are said to be embodied generative models of their 
environments, where a generative model M specifies the probability that a certain external state, 
sensory input, and internal state occur together (Friston 2013). Organisms are said to have Markov 
blankets separating their internal states from the external environment, defined over a set of random 
variables and a probability measure (Kirchhoff et al. 2018). Furthermore, Friston (2009, 2010) 
claims FEP entails the Bayesian brain hypothesis, which implies that nervous systems represent 
probability distributions, store generative models and prior probabilistic knowledge about the 
world, and that neural networks can perform statistical inferences based on these probabilities 
22 
(Knill & Pouget 2004; Colombo & Seriès 2012). Finally, free energy itself is a bound on surprise 
(or information entropy), and surprise is a probabilistic measure of the uncertainty of sampling 
some sensory data, given a generative model. 
 Neglect of both the differing scope of distinct formulations of FEP (as applied to non-
biological adaptive systems, organisms, or brains at a certain time scale) and the interpretations of 
the probabilities in different formulations of FEP has generated disagreement—particularly about 
whether FEP is committed to positing mental representations and to an essentially inferential 
picture of cognition. To move the debate forward, at least two questions should be distinguished. 
First, should we understand FEP as a modeler’s tool to characterize and predict adaptive behavior, 
or should it be understood as an objective feature of target systems? Second, in determining the 
scope of FEP, how should the probabilities it posits be interpreted? Should they be understood 
epistemically or physically? 
 Some researchers in the organicist tradition seem to interpret the probabilities involved in 
FEP physically, as the frequency or propensity of the occurrence of some event (e.g., Bruineberg et 
al. 2018; Kirchhoff & Froese 2017). When FEP targets brains, these researchers reject the idea that 
brains literally represent probabilities and draw inferences. Other researchers have interpreted the 
probabilities involved in FEP epistemically, as rational degrees of belief in the occurrence of some 
event and the willingness to act on this belief. When FEP targets brains, these researchers tend to 
suggest that brains literally represent probabilities, possess Markov blankets, and draw inferences 
(e.g., Hohwy 2016). For his part, Friston (2013) seems to interpret the probabilities involved in FEP 
as objective features of real-world systems; they aren’t just modeling tools. When FEP targets 
brains, he claims that brains represent probabilities about the occurrence of events, and that brains 
make inferences about the causes of their sensory inputs, based on neurally encoded statistical 
models (Friston 2011, 2013). 
 Let’s consider the first idea. In formulating FEP, one need initially specify a system’s phase 
space (or sample space) and a desired equilibrium state distribution over it. One can then optimize 
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the equilibrium state distribution by minimizing the free energy of samples generated by the 
environment with respect to actions and a generative model. The system—claims Friston (2011, 
2013)—will then appear to sample its environment as if it were aiming at maximizing the evidence 
for its own existence. However, the construction of explanations thereof may fall short when the 
explanatory goal is construed as specifying the real nature of biological explananda; and where the 
functional capacities attributed to those systems prove intractable, resorting to ‘as if’ explanation 
won’t circumvent the problem, even when the computations involved are construed as subsymbolic, 
offline, heuristic, or approximate (van Rooij et al. 2018). 
 The desired steady-state distribution is, by definition, just the organism’s evolved 
equilibrium state distribution. This means that minimizing free energy would be equivalent to 
maximizing expected adaptive value: surprising states would just be, by definition, maladaptive. 
One way to support this definition is to note that organisms, and brains, are immersed in a 
“statistical bath” of energy arrays from the environment impinging on their sensory surfaces. These 
energy arrays would sculpt phenotypes, associated with a certain equilibrium steady-state 
distribution, which the organism would update as a function of its sensory samples. 
 However, organicists will argue that defining adaptivity as unsurprisingness is misguided 
and relies on implausible assumptions. With Longo & colleagues (2012), one may note that a 
desired equilibrium state distribution is only definable on a predefined phase space. If it’s not 
possible to predefine a phase space for biological systems, the definition will be undercut—and 
with it, the justification for believing that the probabilities involved in FEP are not mere modeling 
tools but are objective features of living systems. 
 Furthermore, leaving on the side free-energy theorists’ selectionist perspective, one may 
find implausible that surprising events should always be maladaptive. Using Gershman & Daw’s 
examples, “[s]hould the first amphibian out of water dive back in? If a wolf eats deer not because he 
is hungry, but because he is attracted to the equilibrium state of his ancestors, would a sudden 
bonanza of deer inspire him to eat only the amount to which he is accustomed?” (2012: 306). If 
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adaptivity is stipulatively defined in terms of minimization of surprise, then some instances of 
adaptive behavior will consist in seeking out novel situations that may provide systems the 
opportunity to resolve expected surprise. 
 Let’s assume that the probabilities involved in FEP aren’t simply modelers’ tools, and turn 
to the second question about how to interpret these probabilities. In its maximal scope formulation, 
the probabilities involved in FEP should be interpreted physically, as objective propensities or 
frequencies. (After all, it makes little sense to say that an amoeba has a certain degree of belief that 
a bacterium is in the premises.) Physical interpretations of probabilities cohere both with how 
probabilities are generally understood in statistical mechanics, as well as with the suggestion that 
inference talk is inapposite to the behavior of organisms like an amoeba or bacterium, understood as 
dynamical systems coupled with their environment (Bruineberg et al. 2018).11 Finally, a propensity-
based interpretation clarifies the sense in which FEP isn’t a tautology, just like it isn’t a tautology to 
say that dice produce odd numbers more often than threes—more on tautology and FEP in §4.1. 
Propensities of free-energy minimizing organisms to survive, or of dice to fall equally often on each 
side, permit fallible predictions about their behaviors. 
 Yet, a propensity interpretation of the probabilities involved in FEP raises several issues. 
One is that it’s opaque what sort of property a propensity is. If propensities are causal tendencies, 
                                                 
11 The notion of inference in FEP also requires clarification. Bruineberg et al. claim that, “[w]ithin the Free Energy 
framework, the notion of ‘inference’ is much more minimal and does not involve any propositions: any dynamical 
system A coupled with another B can be said to “infer” the “hidden cause” of its “input” (the dynamics of B) when it 
reliably co-varies with the dynamics of B and it is robust to the noise inherent in the coupling” (2018: 2436). They 
invoke Huygens’s case of the synchronization of two pendulum clocks to illustrate this “minimal” sense of inference. 
Three points in response. First, whether or not the concept INFERENCE in FEP involves propositions depends how to 
understand the probabilities featuring in the free energy framework. If these probabilities are modelers’ tools without 
actual counterparts in target systems, then INFERENCE may involve propositions, viz., those propositions entertained by 
scientists when they make inferences about target systems on the basis of the mathematics of random dynamic systems 
theory. Second, reliable covariance robust to noise falls within the extension, not of the concept INFERENCE, but of some 
successor notion; so Bruineberg et al. have not illustrated a “minimal sense” so much as they’ve just changed the 
subject; and doing so may do an injustice to actual scientific practice, where the topic of statistical inference for 
dynamical systems is studied extensively across several fields. Third, Huygens observed phase/-opposition coupling 
between two pendulum clocks hanging from a beam or from a board sitting on two chairs. But FEP is formulated within 
the mathematics of random dynamical systems, and Huygens’s case has not been aptly represented as a problem in 
parameter estimation in dynamical systems—a problem that FEP is supposed to help solve (see Oliveira & Melo 2015). 
So, the question of how INFERENCE should be understood within the free-energy framework is not settled by Bruineberg 
et al.’s claim. 
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then they should be asymmetric and diachronic relationships just like causal relationships. But then 
they cannot be probabilities, since conditional probabilities are symmetric. If propensities are long-
run relative frequencies, then a reference class should be defined. For biological organisms, such a 
reference class would correspond to a phase space; but if a phase space cannot be predefined for an 
organism, the probabilities involved in FEP cannot be defined. 
 Suppose instead that the probabilities in FEP are understood epistemically as rational 
degrees of belief. This interpretation is most plausible when FEP is restricted to whole, cognitively-
sophisticated animals, i.e., to creatures possessing mental representations and capacities for rational 
inference. Organisms would thus act adaptively by minimizing a free-energy bound defined over 
internal, graded, epistemic states representing events in the environment. 
 While this interpretation wouldn’t mitigate the problem of defining a phase space (or sample 
space) for organisms, Friston and colleagues surmise that “sustained exposure to environmental 
inputs causes the internal structure of the brain to recapitulate the causal structure of those inputs. In 
turn, this enables efficient perceptual inference” (Friston et al. 2006: 77). This suggestion risks 
obfuscating that adaptive pressures on biological observers are generally unrelated to the accuracy 
of their epistemic states. The suggestion is also at odds with orthodox Bayesianism, since it 
dovetails the assumption that Bayesian inference is “efficient” or optimal just in case one’s prior 
beliefs match the actual statistics of the environment (Feldman 2017). 
 
4 FEP and mechanism 
We now turn to mechanistic philosophy, and argue that FEP is inconsistent with mechanism along 
two dimensions of representation: the dependence of explanatory force on describing mechanisms 
and the rejection of the idea that life science phenomena can be adequately explained through an 
axiomatic, physics-first approach. 
 
4.1 How to explain life phenomena? 
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Free-energy theorists appeal to FEP  to attempt explanations of various phenomena, including 
Hebb’s rule and spike-timing dependent plasticity, the multiplicity and hierarchical organization of 
cortical layers, their reciprocal connection with distinct feedforward and feedback properties, and 
the existence of adaptation and repetition suppression (Friston 2010a). Such explanations are 
thought of axiomatically, as logical deductions from sets of axioms and formulae (Friston 2012). 
Stipulative definitions, like living system as an attracting set in a phase space or adaptive behavior 
as behavior that reduces average surprise, provide the bridge principles that connect theoretical 
predicates from different disciplines, and that allow free-energy theorists to attempt the deductions 
needed to claim reductions of other principles to FEP. In their sweeping attempt to explain these 
and other phenomena, and to reduce their theories and principles to FEP, free-energy theorists have 
also claimed for their theory another virtue: a grand theoretical unification (Friston 2010a; Hohwy 
2014). 
 In presenting these features, FEP is apparently at odds with mechanists’ emphasis that life 
science phenomena should be explained by appeal to mechanisms, and that adequate strategies for 
explanation in the life sciences should involve decomposing these mechanisms into component 
parts and operations and providing an account of how these parts and operations work together to 
produce the phenomenon. 
 FEP and mechanism are related by their common emphasis on function. Both free-energy 
theorists and mechanists can agree that FEP provides an idealized functional principle. Where they 
diverge is on the issues of whether and when functional accounts of biological phenomena suffice 
for adequate explanation, or whether structural details of component parts and mechanistic 
organization are also necessary for such functional accounts to have explanatory power. 
 Progress in the life sciences—and especially the cognitive and behavioral sciences—often 
begins by empirically identifying and adequately describing a functional capacity. Descriptions of 
that capacity then allow for the method of functional analysis, wherein that capacity is functionally 
decomposed in terms of its constituent properties, processes, and components. Functional properties 
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of a system have traditionally been individuated by their relations to inputs, outputs, and other 
internal properties of the system under investigation—that is, by their causal role. By redescribing 
systems’ capacities in terms of their functional properties and dispositions, functional analysis 
offers scientists a way to tackle the target phenomenon. But it also offers the potential for prediction 
and explanation, as empirical applications of FEP demonstrate (e.g., Bastos et al 2012). 
 FEP provides a functional analysis of adaptive behavior, in the sense that it derives from a 
stipulation that such behaviors must be surprise-minimizing. In the abstract, FEP requires an 
interplay between four sets variables: sensory samples D that influence a system Σ’s internal states, 
and active states A that influence the external states of the local environment Ψ. The mathematical 
dependencies between <Σ (D, A), Ψ> define free energy over Σ as a function of D and an 
approximate probabilistic representation of its causes—the thought being that a system’s capacity to 
adapt to its environment can be functionally analyzed in terms of suppression of free energy, via 
internal representations that readjust state changes in its transducers (to maintain or improve 
perceptual fidelity) or effectors (to maintain or promote successful control). 
 For their part, mechanists have argued at length that functional analyses lack explanatory 
power, as they are mechanism sketches. The notion of a mechanism sketch is that of an incomplete 
representation of (the function of) a mechanism, in which some relevant aspects—either component 
parts or their operations, or their organization—are omitted from the explanation. Biological or 
cognitive functions may be decomposed into their constituent properties, processes, or subroutines; 
and decomposition may detail a capacity as a nexus of functional relationships between variables 
standing for component operations, without thereby specifying how the capacity is actually 
realized. Mechanists acknowledge that functional decompositions of capacities into modeled causal 
and non-causal operations within a mechanism constrain the possible structures and configurations 
that might perform those operations; but they are equally keen to emphasize that structural 
decompositions into modeled components within a mechanism can also constrain the possible 
functions and configurations performed. Details about the relevant physiological and anatomical 
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components of mechanisms are necessary to filling in mechanism sketches by localizing each 
operation to its respective component part (Bechtel & Richardson 1993/2010). 
 Free-energy theorists’ functional analyses appeal to states and dynamics that idealize away 
from the biophysical details of the structural complexity of actual systems. While functional 
analyses may be construed as mechanism sketches, FEP itself doesn’t provide in any obvious sense 
a sketch of a mechanism, since it swings free of the need to supply any microstructural, biophysical, 
or anatomical detail. Mechanists would therefore conclude that FEP lacks explanatory power 
(Kaplan & Craver 2011). 
 Free-energy theorists may reply that FEP defines a class of process models that provide 
hypotheses about how spatiotemporally organized components and operations in biological systems 
might carry out free-energy minimization. For example, some have suggested that predictive coding 
is one mechanism by which FEP works, in which hierarchically-structured neuronal assemblies 
engage in message-passing operations (Friston 2009; Bastos et al. 2012). Higher-order neuronal 
assemblies would output predictions of the states of lower-order assemblies, which are then 
compared with the actual states of the lower-order assemblies to form prediction errors that are 
passed back up the hierarchy to update the predictions from higher-order neural assemblies. The 
recurrent exchange of signals between adjacent neural assemblies resolves prediction error at each 
level, resulting in hierarchically deep, neurally-encoded “accounts” of sensory inputs. 
 While it may go some way toward meeting the demands of filling out a mechanism sketch, 
this suggestion is inadequate for mechanists. First, predictive coding is only one of several possible 
algorithms that may be used to optimize energy functions. Since many of them might be empirically 
adequate but difficult to disentangle, concerns of underdetermination may emerge. Second, while 
predictive coding has been used to model some aspects of visual perception (Rao & Ballard 1999), 
“the experimental evidence for it seems currently inconclusive in the sense that it does not rule out 
Bayesian inference with a direct variable code, potentially in combination with a variety of non-
probabilistic processes” (Aitchison & Lengyel 2017: 224). Third, because FEP is intended to 
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generalize beyond organisms with a nervous system, predictive coding would need to be a 
mechanism by which all adaptive systems work—from bacteria, to winged snowflakes and bladder 
cells, to plants and social networks. Obviously, for such a wide array of systems, appealing to 
message passing in neuronal hierarchies as a relevant mechanism by which they operate is 
insufficiently general. Fourth and finally, even if issues of underdetermination were put aside and 
the experimental evidence for predictive coding were overwhelming, and even if it were shown to 
be the generalized mechanism by which all adaptive systems work, mechanists would be positioned 
to claim that filling out the mechanism sketch is what matters: appeals to the mechanism of 
predictive coding—not FEP—are what provides explanatory depth. For mechanists, functional 
descriptions of capacities that require mechanistic analysis to achieve this depth can be important 
principles, but not foundational ones that do the heavy lifting in ultimately explaining biological 
phenomena. 
 Free-energy theorists may simply reject the idea that adequate scientific representation of 
life science phenomena must target the component parts and operations and internal organization of 
mechanisms. They may refer to Chirimuuta’s (2017) work, which contends that several 
explanatorily adequate models in computational neuroscience are non-mechanistic. The models 
Chirimuuta considers would be instances of “efficient coding explanation,” which, abstracting away 
from biophysical specifics, would answer why certain neuronal systems should behave in the ways 
described by the models. Based on design principles informing the model, such explanations would 
thus identify the functional utility of general patterns of behaviors instantiated by neural systems. 
 Similarly, free-energy theorists may argue that FEP is an optimality principle in the life 
sciences (cf., Rice 2015). FEP, along with the class of process models it defines, provides us with 
idealized, coarse-grained descriptions of certain factors and functional variables, which leverage 
varieties of realization types against the drive to detail lower-level biomechanical structures 
essentially involved in producing target explananda-phenomena. FEP, and the class of process 
models it defines, would omit causal-mechanical detail and make biologically unrealistic 
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assumption to focus attention on very general observable patterns displayed by biological systems, 
but also by any other system behaving adaptively. Given that aim—they might claim—it’s 
misguided to charge FEP for not providing us with mechanistic information. 
 
4.2 FEP as a first principle? 
As we have seen, explanations derived from FEP abstract away and distort most of the mechanistic 
features of their target phenomena. But if FEP doesn’t aim at uncovering mechanisms or difference-
makers, then what’s its epistemic status vis-à-vis mechanistic explanation, exactly? 
 Unfortunately, FEP’s epistemic status is muddled. It has been called an unfalsifiable 
platitude, an imperative, a tautology, a stipulative definition, paradigm, law of the life sciences, law 
of nature, an a priori first principle, a unifying explanation, and a simple postulate or axiom. Wiese 
& Metzinger assert that “FEP can be regarded as the fundamental theory, which can combine the 
different features of predictive processing described above within a single, formally rigorous 
framework” (2017: 12). Friston and collaborators contend that “free energy minimization may be an 
imperative for all self-organizing biological systems” (2012: 2117), and that “the whole point of 
[FEP] is to unify all adaptive autopoietic and self-organizing behavior under one simple imperative; 
avoid surprises and you will last longer […]”, which is a principle so basic that “there is no need to 
recourse to any other principles” (Friston et al. 2012), and “The tautology here is deliberate, it 
appeals to exactly the same tautology in natural selection (Why am I here? – because I have 
adaptive fitness: Why do I have adaptive fitness? – because I am here). Like adaptive fitness, the 
free-energy formulation is not a mechanism or magic recipe for life; it is just a characterization of 
biological systems that exist” (ibid.). For his part, Allen (2018: 19) characterizes FEP as a 
normative theory, an axiomatic, self-evidently true natural law, and a tautologically true axiom, 
likening it to a paradigm, framework, and a research programme as well. 
 This rhetorical jumble makes it harder to understand the status of FEP as a first principle, 
and thus the contrast between FEP and mechanism. So, some clarification is called for. To begin, 
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one should not follow Allen or Wiese & Metzinger in confusing principles with theories, 
paradigms, and research programmes, since these technical terms refer to different species of 
scientific representations, with different properties and scientific and philosophical purposes. 
Likewise, that any self-conserving system, via environmental exchanges, must, as necessary 
condition on the possibility of maximizing its adaptivity, minimize an information-theoretic bound 
on a negative log probability is an intriguing thought—but not one that qualifies as a platitude or a 
truism, under any normal understanding of those concepts. 
 One plausible thought is that FEP is a first principle because it’s an axiom or postulate: 
“[t]he free-energy principle is a simple postulate that has complicated ramifications” (Friston 2011: 
91), and again, “FEP derives [is?] a normative, a priori first principle from a provable definition of 
living systems” (Allen & Friston 2018: 2473).12 And in fact, as mentioned, free-energy theorists 
spin off an enormous variety of derivations from FEP. In that sense, FEP may be said to play the 
role of a first principle. But while the free-energy theorists in the life sciences utilize an axiomatic 
approach grounded in the mathematics of theoretical physics (Friston 2012), FEP is a principle that 
is itself derived from other statements and definitions. So, it is not an underived axiom or postulate, 
strictly speaking. By implication, principles like FEP need not be underived axioms to play the role 
of first principle in the life sciences. 
Free-energy theorists often characterize FEP as a principle in the life sciences because it’s 
“tautological,” even “unfalsifiable.” Such claims are not easily interpreted. If FEP were a tautology, 
then free energy theorists may have a triviality problem. As Klein remarks, “[a]ppeal to apparent 
tautologies should trouble you. For whatever tautologies do, they don’t explain why things happen” 
(2018: 2552). Tautologies may offer a starting point for explaining the end goal states of optimal 
systems, but the empirical adequacy of models with added biophysical causal detail is far removed 
                                                 
12 It’s unclear in what sense the definition of living system as an attracting set is “provable.” Definitions are 
commonly restatements that do not stand in need of proof, or are even capable of being proved. More 
plausibly, Friston & colleagues want to claim that the definition they propose is legitimate—though it’s not 
obvious what criteria of legitimacy should be in place to evaluate this claim. 
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from triviality. And the attempted explanations relying on FEP do not involve anything like the 
decomposition and localization of biophysical mechanisms underlying adaptive behavior. 
 Similarly, falsifiability is normally treated as a hallmark of any scientific claim; so if 
principles must be falsifiable to be scientific and FEP is unfalsifiable, then FEP is not a scientific 
principle. What’s intended cannot be that FEP is unfalsifiable because it’s merely stipulated; for 
while there are stipulative definitions involved in the transcendental argument, FEP is not one of 
them. Similarly, what’s intended cannot be that FEP is unfalsifiable because it fails to be truth-apt, 
since it would then not be a law-like generalization, and could not serve as the conclusion of a 
transcendental argument. Presumably, then, FEP is like all other scientific principles in being truth-
apt, such as Archimedes’s principle describing basic relationships in fluid dynamics. But unlike 
other principles such as Galileo’s principle describing the periodicity of pendula, which 
subsequently enjoyed more accurate and precise formulations, it seems that what’s intended is that 
principles like FEP or Hamilton’s PLA survive all scrutiny of their pedigree and have truth-values 
that cannot be improved upon. In that sense, FEP might be a constraint that mechanist explanations 
in the life sciences must honor, in so far as life scientists aim to determine which values of some 
energy functional constitute the best available solution—given certain design constraints—to the 
problem of maintaining the path of a target biological system in state space within a specific 
(homeostatic) region that precludes phase transitions. Claims of tautologousness and 
unfalsifiability, in addition to being interpretively difficult, just lead to further questions about its 
epistemic status, such as whether free-energy theorists, in taking FEP to be a necessary condition on 
the possibility of adaptive behavior, thereby take FEP to be some kind of necessary truth. 
 Unlike what advocates have claimed (e.g., Hohwy 2014), FEP-based theorizing is not 
consistent with mechanists’ idea that the power of an explanation depends on its capacity to 
uncover the mechanism of a target phenomenon. But unlike what mechanists will reply, the 
response is not obviously just to claim, “so much the worse for FEP”. This apparent inconsistency 
is methodologically good: the boom of research relying on FEP just highlights there is room for 
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deductive systematization and physics-first approaches in life science theorizing (see also Gurova 
2011). Rather than aiming to represent difference-makers of life science phenomena, FEP instead 
aims to represent, in the language of information theory and random dynamical systems theory, 
what characteristics complex systems must possess for self-maintenance and self-regulation. 
  
5 Conclusion: a plurality of principles 
Living organisms are complex, adaptive systems that present both robust regularities but also 
constant variation. Understanding their regularities and variations requires conceptual frameworks 
in which knowledge from physics, chemistry, biology, ecology, and ethology can be synthesized, 
using tools from mathematics and computational theory. The diversity of expertise involved in 
understanding brains and organisms, and the fragmentation in present-day neuroscience and 
biology, highlights the need for principles that could afford a common intellectual framework for 
researchers from different communities to work together to answers questions of common concern. 
 FEP is an impressive candidate for one such first principle aiming to ground general, 
idealized models for tracking one fundamental pattern underlying the robust regularities and 
constant variation displayed by complex and diverse phenomena in the life sciences. FEP 
symbolizes what a first-principle, physics-first, axiomatic approach to the life sciences can look 
like, while it has crystallized the notion of prediction-error minimization in philosophical and 
scientific debates as a central theoretical posit to understanding life and mind. 
 In this paper, we have identified apparent disagreements between FEP and basic tenets of 
organicism and mechanicism concerning the scientific representation of life phenomena. The 
incompatibility between these different approaches should not suggest that only one of these 
approaches can aptly represent the phenomena of life. These different approaches are meant to 
fulfill different epistemic aims of different communities of life scientists; and these aims may be 
best pursued separately, with a diverse array of tools for piecemeal modeling, prediction, and 
understanding of target phenomena. 
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 Motivated by the kind of pragmatic, epistemic pluralism endorsed by fundamental inquiries 
like Smith & Morowitz (2016) and by philosophers of the life sciences like Mitchell (2002), we 
conclude with a note of caution against indulging in metaphysical speculation on the basis of 
scientific tools for modeling and representations of the phenomena of life (cf., Potochnik 2017: 
§7.2). While we may legitimately and productively argue about the aptness of a tool for its intended 
purposes, the risk of confusion is high when philosophers and scientists directly reads off 
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